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Abstract
The paper elaborates the theory of imagination in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason and Critique of Judgment. From the first Critique to the third Critique, the 
imagination emerges under different titles such as reproductive, productive or tran-
scendental imagination. The paper shall try to decide whether its functions suggested 
in the first Critique and its performance in the third Critique are contradictory or 
developmental with respect to Kant’s critical philosophy. Thus, it will examine of 
the power and the scope of the imagination in the first Critique and of its status and 
performance in the third Critique. 
Keywords: I. Kant, aesthetic comprehension, imagination, inner sense, 
synthesis.
Resumen
El artículo discute la teoría de la imaginación en la Crítica de la razón pura y la Crítica 
del juicio de Immanuel Kant. Desde la primera Crítica y hasta la tercera, la imagina-
ción recibe diferentes calificativos, tales como imaginación reproductiva, productiva 
o trascendental. El trabajo intenta determinar si las funciones de la imaginación su-
geridas en la primera Crítica y su papel en la tercera Crítica son contradictorias o si 
implican más bien un desarrollo respecto de la filosofía crítica de Kant. Para ello, se 
examina el poder y el alcance de la imaginación en la primera Crítica y su estatus y 
papel en la tercera. 
Palabras clave: I. Kant, comprensión estética, imaginación, sentido  
interno, síntesis.
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Introduction
The notion of the imagination has led to a great deal of discussion 
in Kantian scholarship. Kant never dedicates a separate section to this 
controversial topic. In The Critique of Pure Reason (1781), a section 
entitled “The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding”1 is 
generally accepted to contain much of his view on the imagination. 
However, in 1787, in the second edition of the Critique, Kant revises the 
section known as the A-edition. In the late, i.e. the B-edition, he omits 
almost the entire earlier section of “Deduction”. This alteration sparked 
numerous discussions about the role of the imagination in Kant’s cogni-
tive understanding. Although there are considerably more studies on 
the imagination as it is in the context of the first Critique, the aim of 
this paper is not merely to participate in those discussions. Rather, this 
paper shall focus on the changes in Kant’s handling of the imagination 
between the first and the third Critiques. To this end, as well as the A 
and B-editions, the pre-conceptual or rather non-conceptual realm 
addressed by the third Critique shall be analysed by tracking the state 
of the imagination in the aesthetic judgment upon the sublime. This 
will enable us to recognize the central role and the radical potential 
of this faculty for both the cognitive and aesthetic realms of Kantian 
philosophy. 
In what follows, first, the synthetic functions of the imagination in 
the first Critique shall be reviewed in order to explain the part it plays 
in cognition. After that, to give a brief account of its role in the third 
Critique, the experience of beauty and the arts will be briefly outlined. 
The last section of the paper will concentrate on the regressive perfor-
mance of the imagination in relation to time in the judgment of the 
sublime. This kind of analysis will reveal the significance of the imagi-
nation in Kant’s philosophy. 
Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason2 
In the first Critique, Kant defines three original sources for all pos-
sible experience, namely sense, imagination and apperception. They are 
called the capacities or the faculties of the soul and together they entail 
the conditions of all possible experience. Among these faculties, sense 
is responsible from receiving stimuli in the form of raw material, while 
apperception involves the consciousness of the received and processed 
intuitions in a subject. Imagination, regarding its function, stands 
between the two and has a central role in cognition. As we mentioned 
1 Hereafter “Deduction”.
2 The references to this work will appear as the abbreviation CPR and the letter “A” for 
the A-edition, and “B”, for the B-edition proceeded by Arabic numerals.
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earlier, this role is taken up quite differently by Kant in the first, A-edition 
(1781) of “Deduction” from the B-edition. Now, let us visit these editions 
briefly in order to have an idea of the function of the imagination in the 
process of fabricating knowledge. 
The A-edition of the “Deduction”
 According to Kant, representations would mean nothing to each other 
in the absence of a synthesis. Hence, a synthesis is the essential operation 
appealing to the representations of both empirical and a priori origin. It 
is “the act of putting different representations together, and of grasping 
(begreifen) what is manifold in them in one [act of] knowledge” (CPR A 
77; B 103). As it is, synthesis is the staple of cognition and a function of the 
faculty of the imagination. It compares and connects the representations 
that are given by the faculty of sense in the form of a synopsis. The syn-
thesis is achieved in a threefold operation which entails, The Synthesis of 
Apprehension in Intuition, The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination, 
and The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept (cf. CPR A 97).
According to Kant, each intuition received by sensibility contains 
a manifold or multiplicity, and this multiplicity cannot be represented 
as a manifold unless it is conceived as a sequence of impressions in 
time. The Synthesis of Apprehension in Intuition indicates the synthesis 
of a manifold of intuitions in a single representation. Since for Kant, 
if a “unity of intuition may arise out of this manifold (as is required 
in the representation of space) it must first be run through, and held 
together” (CPR A 99), the Synthesis of Apprehension presents a manifold 
as a manifold in a single representation. In this way, it serves as the first 
ordering of the manifold of intuitions. It does not entail any connection 
or necessity, so it can be said that in apprehension, empirical intuition 
is just placed together. 
The synthesis of the intuitions in apprehension is an empirical act 
of the imagination. There is also a transcendental act of the imagina-
tion. The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination which is also called 
reproductive imagination is this transcendental act or power of the 
imagination. It is a requisite for knowledge because the “reproducibility 
of appearances” is an obligation for experience (cf. CPR A 101). As the 
second level, The Synthesis of Reproduction in Imagination is the ability 
of recalling past representations in memory. The various representa-
tions of an object are connected in a synthetic unity in such a way that 
the representation can be reproduced or made vivid again in memory. 
Otherwise no experience would be possible. Kant expresses the signifi-
cance of reproduction in the example of drawing a line: 
When I seek to draw a line in thought, or to think of the time from one 
noon to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, 
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obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must 
be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always 
to drop out of thought the preceding representations (the first parts of 
the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order 
represented), and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that 
follow, a complete representation would never be obtained: none of the 
above-mentioned thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary 
representations of space and time, could arise. (CPR A 102)
Clearly, the syntheses of apprehension and reproduction of the 
imagination are dependent on each other. Kant writes that the synthe-
sis of apprehension supplies the transcendental ground of both pure 
a priori and empirical knowledge. Yet, the reproductive synthesis of 
the imagination can be counted among the transcendental acts of the 
mind, since the reproduction of the past intuitions has no root in the 
empirical realm. By this means, reproduction appears as an a priori act. 
Following these, Kant announces this act as the transcendental power 
of imagination (cf. CPR A 102). 
The last mode of synthesis, The Synthesis of Recognition in a Concept 
implies the unity of synthesis that enables us to think concepts. Concepts 
are universal in their form and they are central to our knowledge of the 
world. As the most convenient means of our knowledge, the notion of 
concept necessitates the unity of the representations belonging to the 
same object under a general category. In this process, the faculty of the 
imagination appears as the primary faculty as it enables understanding 
to operate by subsuming the diverse representations of an object under 
the concept of that object. In this way, we can think of the object and 
have the knowledge of it. For instance, in counting numbers, we add 
a unit to another successively and without the unity of synthesis, we 
would not be able to proceed. The concept of the number is built upon 
the “consciousness of this unity of the synthesis” (CPR A 103).
The threefold synthesis gives the imagination its significant role in 
cognition. In this edition, Kant also treats the imagination as a distinct 
faculty of the mind.3 It works as a mediator between sensibility and 
understanding (CPR A 124). Hence, it is clear that in the A-edition of 
the Deduction, the imagination appears as central to both a priori and 
3 Among Kant’s commentators, Martin Heidegger, Rudolf Makkreel, Sarah Lee Gibbons 
and John Llewellyn take the A-edition as the original source on the imagination and 
support this claim. Yet, Paul Guyer, Henri Allison and Peter Frederick Strawson con-
tend the opposite by leaning on the claim that by revising the A-edition, Kant corrects 
a mistake and accurately announces the imagination as merely a function of the faculty 
of the understanding.
[58]
departamento de filosofía • facultad de ciencias humanas • universidad nacional de colombia
Tugba Ayas Onol
empirical knowledge. Yet, as we shall see, in the later edition released 
in 1787, the role of the imagination is downplayed.
B-edition of the “Deduction”
In the B-edition of the “Deduction”, the imagination is first defined 
as the “faculty of representing in intuition an object that is not itself 
present” (CPR B 151). As to its relation to sensibility, Kant writes that 
“Now since all our intuition is sensible, the imagination, owing to the 
subjective condition under which alone it can give to the concepts of 
understanding a corresponding intuition, belongs to sensibility” (CPR B 
151). Following Kant in the B-edition, Sarah Gibbons, accurately says that 
Kant “demotes” the imagination from being a “fundamental faculty of 
the human soul” to being a “mere function of the understanding” (cf. 37).4 
Compared to the A-edition, the role of the imagination is much less 
emphasized in the B-edition. In the latter, it is given to the “service” 
of the understanding along with the tasks of reproduction and com-
parison. In this edition, its most important participation seems to pave 
the way for “the original synthetic unity of apperception”, that is, the 
consciousness of the “I think” which necessarily accompanies all rep-
resentations. Because of this, Kant writes: “imagination is […] a faculty 
which determines the sensibility a priori; and its synthesis of intuitions, 
conforming as it does to the categories must be the transcendental syn-
thesis of imagination”(CPR B 151-152). The transcendental synthesis of 
imagination implies the act of understanding in which it determines 
the sensibility internally (cf. CPR B 153). Due to its transcendental char-
acter, it is the basis of all other possible applications of understanding 
concerning the objects of all possible experience. 
The transcendental use of the imagination resides in its function in 
the act of schematizing. When it is responsible for producing a schema in 
order to subsume the intuitions (particulars) given by sensibility under 
a concept (universal), it is called productive imagination or “figurative 
synthesis” (cf. CPR B 151). 
We learn about the productive side of the imagination when Kant 
looks for the answer of “How, [...] is the subsumption of intuitions under 
pure concepts, the application of a category to appearances, possible?” 
This application requires a third kind of representation that is both 
intellectual and sensible, and also homogenous both in category and 
appearance. Kant calls this kind of a representation the transcendental 
4 As a proponent of the A-edition she writes: “Imagination, in its connection with 
understanding and reason, is a characteristically human capacity, and therefore a 
clarification of its functions and of reason’s dependence on it allows us to characterize 
a distinctively human kind of knowing” (Gibbons 2).
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schema (cf. CPR A 138; B 177). The schema is a product of the imagination. 
It is universal and can never be represented in one single representation. 
Hence, an image is a product of the empirical faculty of reproductive 
imagination, whereas the schema of a concept is a product of a priori 
imagination (cf. CPR A 141; B 180). Following this, then, the schema of 
a concept is a means to subsume a particular representation under a 
specific concept of a thing. Kant writes, for instance:
The concept of a “dog” signifies a rule according to which my imag- 
ination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general 
manner, without limitation to any single determinate figure such as ex-
perience, or any possible image that I can represent in concreto, actually 
presents. (CPR A 141; B 180)
Kant mentions the act of schematization as “an art concealed in the 
depths of human soul” (cf. CPR A 141; B 180-181). The unknown portrait 
of schematism causes the view that Kant’s usage of schema is sometimes 
ambiguous. For instance, Donald Crawford rightly asserts that “on 
the one hand it is characterized as both a product of the imagination 
and the intuition, on the other hand it is said to be a rule or universal 
procedure of the imagination which exists only in thought” (2003 153). 
According to Jonathan Francis Bennett, Kant appeals to “schematism” 
because he hopes to account for causality and schematism enables the 
conditionality or “if-then-relatedness” (qtd. in Crawford 2003 153). 
Roughly, in the first Critique, the imagination synthesizes the mani-
fold of intuitions, reproduces images, schematizes. It is also responsible 
for the synthesis of a priori intuitions i.e., space and time which are, in 
the end, the very conditions of all possible experience. Furthermore, the 
categories, which are situated high in the hierarchy of cognition, have 
to employ synthesized intuitions to perform a proper cognition and in 
this sense the function of imagination appears to be more elementary 
(cf. Schlutz 85). Despite all its significant functions, Kant seems to be 
indecisive about the imagination when he writes that it is “a blind but 
indispensable function of the soul5 without which we should have no 
knowledge whatsoever, but of which we are scarcely ever conscious (cf. 
CPR A 78; B 103). Therefore, it is not easy to sum up the role of the imagina-
tion in the first Critique. Due to this intricacy, Kantian scholarship does 
not seem to prefer one edition to the other. Both editions are referred 
to by scholars. Furthermore, an analysis of the role or the scope of the 
imagination in the third Critique is usually performed in comparison to 
5 In his own working copy of the first edition, Kant changed the word “soul” for “un-
derstanding”. This fact also seems to support the claim of his undecidable attitude on 
the matter. 
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the first Critique. In order to evaluate its status in the realm of aesthetics, 
we will also take the same route and refer to the elementary functions of 
the imagination such as the threefold synthesis, reproductive imagina-
tion, and its a priori synthesis of time in the first Critique.
Imagination in the Critique of Judgment6
The third Critique presents the faculty of judgment. Hoping to 
reconcile the realms of theoretical and practical reason, Kant places 
this faculty between the faculties of cognition and desire. As a distinct 
faculty, judgment employs reflective thinking and works in accordance 
with its own principles in aesthetic reflection. 
An important shift in Kant’s treatment of the imagination is rec-
ognized in his account of reflective judgments or judgments of taste. 
In the third Critique, the imagination is treated once again, as a fac-
ulty of mind. Moreover, in the formation of aesthetic judgments it is 
detected to operate without appealing to concepts or the categories in 
an aesthetic encounter. 
 Among several judgments of taste, in the judgment of the beauti-
ful, when the imagination performs a mere apprehension of the form 
an object and this form triggers a free play between the faculties of the 
imagination and the understanding, a feeling of pleasure arises. Due to 
this feeling of pleasure, the subject judges the object of aesthetic reflec-
tion as beautiful (cf. CJ VII). Hence, according to Kant, in discerning 
what is beautiful or not we do not appeal to the understanding or the 
representation of the object but to the faculty of the imagination. This 
indicates a considerable shift in the status of the imagination in the 
hierarchy of the faculties of the mind. As revealed in the encounter 
with beauty, the imagination reflects on the form of the object alone, 
without appealing the concepts of the understanding. Hence, it is not 
wrong to say that the imagination is in charge in aesthetic judgments. 
Furthermore, other than the judgments of the beautiful, the role of the 
imagination is central also in the judgment of the sublime and the arts. 
In the “General Remark”, Kant indicates that in the judgment of 
taste, the imagination is not reproductive but productive in its function. 
It acts freely “as originator of arbitrary forms of possible intuitions” (CJ 
§22). Moreover, in its free lawfulness, it accords with the understanding. 
Nonetheless, Kant warns us that this does not mean that the imagina-
tion is autonomous, for it is not self-determined and it cannot generate 
laws like the understanding. Thus, here free lawfulness is “conformity 
to a law without a law” and, it indicates the subjective conformity of the 
imagination to the understanding. 
6 The references to this Critique will appear as the abbreviation CJ and the symbol “§” 
preceded by Arabic numerals and they are to the translation by James Creed Meredith.
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The notion of the productive imagination becomes clear in the 
sections where Kant deals with arts and genius. Kant’s views on art are 
focused on the creation rather than the evaluation of art work. An art 
work is created by an artist or genius who rules art. Art, nature and 
genius complement each other in Kant’s definition of genius as follows: 
“genius is the innate mental aptitude (ingenium) through which nature 
gives rule to the art” (CJ §46). The talent of an artist is an “innate produc-
tive faculty of the artist”. From this productive faculty of artist either a 
tasteful or a soulless work emerges. 
In section §49, the power of creation by the imagination (in its pro-
ductive fashion) turns up as a “powerful agent for creating, as it were, 
a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature”. 
The power to create “new” forms is indeed to remodel the registered 
content of experience for Kant. Nature’s given perceptions can be reor-
ganized in a new fashion by means of the employment of the productive 
imagination. By this means, we get a sense of our freedom from the law 
of association (which is attached to the empirical employment of the 
imagination). An unnatural form can be grasped in this way and since 
its parts belong to nature, the production Kant talks about is more like 
a collage. At this point, what needs attention is the freedom bestowed 
upon the productive imagination. Even if this freedom is not absolute, 
we can still talk about an extension in the function of the imagination. 
Basically, its performance of free play and its being the originator or 
the author of arbitrary forms of possible intuitions suggests that the 
imagination is more liberal in the third Critique. 
As for the synthetic acts of the imagination presented in the first 
Critique, the possible use of the threefold syntheses in the third Critique 
has been a point of discussion. Makkreel states that since aesthetic 
apprehension is non-determinant and subjective, which implies its being 
non-conceptual and reflective, the synthesis cannot be applied in the 
aesthetic realm. He writes: “Kant’s text supplies no direct evidence for 
equating the aesthetic apprehension of imagination with the syntheses 
of apprehension and reproduction, for there is no mention of synthesis 
in his account of aesthetic apprehension without a concept” (1990 50). 
For Paul Guyer, it is possible to apply the first two stages of the threefold 
synthesis and leave out the synthesis in recognition of a concept in the 
imagination’s performance of unifying the manifold in non-conceptual 
fashion (cf. 85-86).7 This kind of thinking seems to preserve the claim 
7 Hannah Ginsborg opposes this view reminding us that for Kant all synthesis is neces-
sarily subjected to the categories. For Guyer’s response and Ginsborg’s counter response, 
see Ginsborg’s “Lawfulness without a Law: Kant on the Free Play of Imagination and 
Understanding” (cf. 45-46).
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for the cognitive import of aesthetic judgments for Makkreel and so, he 
warns us that it might culminate in placing the “aesthetic imagination 
in a pre-cognitive sphere, contributing, in effect, an unconsummated 
or inferior mode of knowledge” (Makkreel 1990 51).8 
A well argued counterpoint to Makkreel’s approach can be found 
in Jean-François Lyotard’s interpretation of the sublime. By appealing 
to a footnote in the B-edition of the “Deduction”, Lyotard claims that 
the threefold synthesis is applicable and indeed presupposed by the 
“axiom of composition” in the sublime (cf. Lyotard 104). In the first 
Critique, composition (Zusammensetzung) is defined as “the synthesis 
of the homogenous in everything that can be mathematically treated” 
(CPR B 197-198). According to Lyotard, in the sublime in the axiom of 
composition, the comprehension of the magnitude corresponds to the 
first two stages of the threefold synthesis, namely, Apprehension and 
Reproduction. As for the last synthesis, Recognition, it “appears to cor-
respond what the axiom calls the ‘consciousness of the unity’ already 
obtained by composition, because this consciousness of the unity is 
nothing other than the concept of magnitude” (Lyotard 105).
These interpretations of the role of the imagination suggest that 
from the first to the third Critique, Kant’s approach to the imagina-
tion differs in a considerable fashion. Moreover, the possible relation 
of aesthetic apprehension to cognition is not explained clearly by the 
philosopher. This relation becomes much more challenging in the new 
face of the imagination revealed in the sublime. In the judgment of the 
sublime, the aesthetic apprehension of the imagination seems to violate 
the fundamental principle of cognition. In the following section, the 
sublime experience will be visited in order to examine this claim closely.
Imagination in the Analytic of the Sublime
As we have seen earlier, the judgment of the beautiful results from the 
harmony (Stimmung) of the faculties of the presentation (imagination) 
and the pure concepts (understanding). Basically, the form of the object 
in question awakens the feeling of accord between the representation 
of the object and the very structure of the faculty of understanding. In 
Kant’s language, the form of the object represents nature and the har-
mony between the two faculties of the mind designates that a form of 
nature is in accord with the structure of the understanding. 
8 Indeed, Makkreel’s argument is a response to Crawford’s claim (cf. 1974 90) which 
suggests that experience of the art object is not different from the ordinary experience 
in application of the reproducibility of apprehension and therefore, it is problematic 
for Kant to argue that aesthetic imagination is not reproductive. For Makkreel, in the 
aesthetic realm it is not experience but apprehension is what is at stake. For details see 
Makkreel (1990 50).
[63]
ideas y valores · vol. lxiv · n.o 157 • abril 2015 • issn 0120-0062 (impreso)  2011-3668 (en línea) • bogotá, colombia • pp. 53 - 69
Reflections on kant’s view of the imagination
The judgment of the sublime, on the contrary, is the result of the 
pain and pleasure felt due to the failure of the imagination to aesthet-
ically estimate the size or the might of a natural grandeur. In an aesthetic 
encounter in which the imagination is compelled to measure the size of 
a massive object of nature, the imagination fails if the object detected is 
absolutely great. This kind of sublime feeling is called the mathemati-
cally sublime and when it is the might of the object that is concerned, 
then, it is the dynamically sublime that is at stake. 
In the sublime experience, a new occasion, which can never hold 
for theoretical reason, is introduced between the imagination and the 
highest faculty in the hierarchy of human mind namely, reason. Until 
the sublime encounter, the imagination appeared only in relation to the 
faculty of the understanding. Yet, in the aesthetic comprehension of the 
object in the sublime, the idea of absolutely great or absolutely strong 
requires the application of the Ideas. Therefore, reason, the faculty of 
the Ideas accompanies the imagination in the sublime. This designates 
a significant shift from theoretical reason and a new face for the imagi-
nation peculiar to aesthetic or subjective reflection. For the sake of the 
simplicity of the argument, we will proceed to explore the imagination 
in the mathematically sublime. 
As the faculty of the representation, the imagination is compelled 
to transcend its own limit during its attempt to represent the size of 
the object. Achieving such an end requires that the imagination must 
progress ad infinitum (cf. CJ §25). In the mathematically sublime, Kant 
defines two operations for the imagination: apprehension (Auffassung) 
and comprehension (Zusammenfassung). In the face of an absolutely 
great object, the imagination can perform apprehension infinitely. Yet, 
comprehension has a limit confronting the limit of comprehension and 
at the same time being compelled to represent the idea of infinity, the 
imagination feels inadequate (cf. CJ §26). For Kant,
[...] the inner perception of the inadequacy of every standard of sense 
to serve for the rational estimation of magnitude is a coming into accord 
with reason’s laws, and a displeasure that makes us alive to the feeling 
of the supersensible side of our being, according to which it is final, and 
consequently a pleasure, to find every standard of sensibility falling short 
of the ideas of reason. (CJ §27)
In its misery to represent what is required, reason allows the imagina-
tion to expand. Thus, by this extension of the imagination (Erweiterung), 
the comprehension of the sublime object is achieved. As for the operation 
of the imagination, Kant writes that apprehending space is an objective 
moment in the imagination and in this sense it indicates progression. 
However, “the comprehension of the successively apprehended parts 
[64]
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at one glance is a retrogression that removes the time-condition in the 
progression of the imagination, and renders co-existence (Zugleihsein) 
intuitable” (CJ §27). This is the subjective performance of the imagina-
tion that “does violence to inner sense” (ibd.).
To elaborate the repercussions of this “subjective movement” for 
the critical philosophy, it is necessary to consult the first Critique. As 
we already know, the imagination in its transcendental use (productive 
imagination) is responsible for the production of a priori intuitions of 
time and space that govern the whole possible experience. Time is “the 
form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of our inner 
state” (CPR A 33; B 50). Under its authority, the imagination intuits in a 
successive or serial mode. For instance, in counting, I am aware that each 
time I add a unit successively and due to the consciousness of the unity 
of synthesis I know the number. In the third Critique, conversely, in the 
section that deals with aesthetic apprehension of an object a possibility 
for intuition of coexistence (Zugleichsein) is introduced. 
In the first Critique, in the section where Kant deals with the “Third 
Analogy”, the notion of coexistence proposes that “things are coexistent 
when in empirical intuition the perceptions of them can follow upon 
one another reciprocally” (CPR A 211; B 257). Accordingly, coexistence 
purports that two manifolds of intuitions exist at one and the same 
time. However, it is not possible to intuit two appearances at one time 
as perceptions due to the basic fact that appearances are apprehended 
successively under the necessity of time. The imagination apprehends 
them in sequence and the understanding comprehends their relation as 
coexistence. Following this, it is easy to recognize that coexistence is a 
link that is not intuitable but comprehensible. Thus, the link of coex- 
istence is of a higher degree and it has nothing to do with the imagina-
tion according to Kant’s theoretical reason.
In the third Critique, however, the imagination can suspend the 
progressive sequence of time and move regressively to enable the intui-
tion of coexistence. Now, according to Kant, this is not a new function 
of the imagination. What we witness in aesthetic comprehension is a 
subjective movement of the imagination. The intuition of co-existence 
is a violation with respect to the inner sense which is conditioned by 
time sequence. Yet, Kant writes that the attempt of the imagination to 
apprehend a magnitude in one glance (in einem Augenblick) is a “mode 
of representation, which, subjectively considered, is contra-final, but, 
objectively, is requisite for the estimation of magnitude, and is conse-
quently final” (CJ §27). Therefore, for the sake of intuiting an object of 
nature that evokes the sublime feeling in us the annihilation of inner 
sense is unavoidable in the subjective movement. 
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Kant’s approach has been discussed from different angles. Here I 
will revisit a transcendental and a poststructuralist approach regard-
ing the notion of the “violence to inner sense”. This, I hope, will help us 
comprehend the position of the imagination with respect to the whole 
critical frame. 
To begin with, Makkreel contends that the “violence to inner 
sense” would be a “violation of the critical framework” if the aesthetic 
comprehension suggested a “mode of intuition that transcends time” (1984 
308). Similarly, Lyotard writes that if the imagination were able to satisfy 
reason, then it would mean to “there would no longer be an inner sense to 
organize representations in a time series. The subject would be deprived 
of the means of constituting its subjectivity” (144). Yet, it does not. Kant 
clearly states that all appearances are subject to time. Moreover, it is only 
time that can “determine them as existing in a twofold manner, either as 
in succession to one another or as coexisting” (CPR A 161; B 202). Makkreel 
himself does not favor this option and writes that the “violation of internal 
sense” is better interpreted as a “possibility of negating mathematical or 
linear form of time” (cf. 1984 308; 1990 73). 
Makkreel supports his argument by suggesting a correction in the 
translation of the German word Augenblick. According to him, the word 
Augenblick which is translated as “comprehension in a glance” (both 
in Bernard and Meredith translations of Critique of Judgment) but it 
should rather be translated as “comprehension in an instant”. Next, fol-
lowing Kant in the first Critique, where an instant is defined as a “mere 
position” that can limit time, which is a continuum (cf. CPR A 169; B 211), 
he claims that comprehension in an instant can only be a limit point 
for a time line. This limit point cannot be interpreted as transcendence 
or annihilation of time as such but rather as a limitation to it. In other 
words, comprehension in an instant enables the imagination to com-
prehend aesthetically in its regressive mode (cf. Makkreel 1984 308).
With this argument, Makkreel tries to rescue Kant from falling 
into metaphysical speculation and keep the query of the sublime in 
the transcendental frame. His transcendental reading addresses the 
regress of the imagination as a practice of this faculty in pause with 
respect to the linear kind of thinking. This remark is favorable for the 
transcendental frame because it can mean that the third Critique and 
so, the faculty of judgment, can play with the linearity of time. This line 
of thinking supports the unity of the faculties. Yet, the regress of the 
imagination is controversial and there is –at least– another view that 
can contribute to the discussion.
Lyotard interprets the regress of the imagination as “the double 
weakening of the principle of succession”. One is “a weakening in the 
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strict sense due to the ‘regression’ of the imagination” and the other is “a 
weakening (in a loose sense) an extemporalization due to the ‘presence’ 
of the Idea of reason”. These two “feelings” correspond to the acts of the 
imagination and reason: the first is the imagination’s “fear of losing the 
minimal power that the thinking has of synthesizing givens (it is own 
included) by succession”; and the second is reason’s “exaltation of the 
recovering the maximal power that thinking has of beginning a series 
of givens without being bound to it”. Regarding these feelings of fear 
and exaltation, Lyotard writes that in the former case the fear of the 
imagination due to the risk of annihilating time threatens the faculty 
of knowledge whereas in the latter, the exaltation of reason indicates 
the founding of the faculty of desire (cf. 145). 
Kant, however, has never considered the repercussions of the regres-
sion of the imagination with respect to the linear structure of time. For 
him, the imagination abandons its dependence on the empirical law in 
order to resolve its conflict with reason. This sacrifice (aufopfert) pro-
cures for the imagination an extension and a might through which the 
aesthetic comprehension is enabled. Hence, according to Kant:
[...] the inner perception of the inadequacy of every standard of sense 
to serve for the rational estimation of magnitude is a coming into accord 
with reason’s laws, and a displeasure that makes us alive to the feeling 
of the supersensible side of our being, according to which it is final, and 
consequently a pleasure, to find every standard of sensibility falling short 
of the ideas of reason. (CJ §27) 
In Kant’s philosophy, supersensible means the intelligible or “what 
transcends experience”. Thus, the supersensible side of our being cor-
responds to the “transcendental conditions of the judging subject” 
(Makkreel 1990 81). The supersensible substrate referred to in the sub-
lime is a “transcendental idea that allows us to assume the mutual 
purposiveness of nature and the subject in aesthetic judgments […] 
–and in this sense the– sublime points to the possibility of an overall 
integration of our faculties of mind” (id. 83). According to this line of 
thought, the sublime is the disclosure of this supersensible substrate 
and also the unveiled relation between this substrate of humanity and 
aesthetic judgments. This transcendental unity between the faculties is 
best revealed by the aesthetic comprehension, since it signals a “unity 
between the finite and the infinite that characterizes the human subject 
in the feeling of the sublime” (id. 87).
In opposition to the transcendental approach, Lyotard interprets 
the displeasure that arises when confronting the finite limit of thought 
as “the extreme dissonance between the powers of thought.” This dis-
sonance is at the same time a “consonance” or pleasure deduced from 
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the supersensible substrate for Kant (cf. Lyotard 147). Yet, according to 
him, “the object that occasions sublime is assuredly ‘a sign’, that is, the 
sign of supersensible sphere but it disarms the presentation and goes 
so far as to discredit the phenomenality of the phenomenon” (Lyotard 
1994  237). Thus, the encounter of the imagination and reason indicates 
a differend in a sense they each know the idiom (Form, Idea) of the other 
as well as the limits of it. That is, the form is finite and the imagination 
cannot represent the absolute in a form. Furthermore, an Idea is infinite 
and cannot be represented positively in a form. There is no common 
judgment that can be applied to both parties. Following this remark 
we can recognize that for Lyotard, the conflict of the faculties does not 
culminate in a discovery of the unity of the system but on the contrary, 
it guarantees that in Kant’s aesthetics, we confront the incommensu-
rability of the faculties of the mind.9 
Conclusion 
So far we have traced the employment of the imagination in Kant’s 
two Critiques. We have reported various uses of the imagination in the 
A and B-editions of “Deduction” providing the distinctions as Kant 
presents them. As a result, we indicated that Kant takes an unsettled 
position with respect to the imagination in the first Critique. In the third 
Critique, however, the imagination is assigned to some non-synthetic 
functions; it is appointed as the faculty of representations and related 
to both the understanding and reason without any mediation. In par-
ticular, imagination’s accord with the understanding in a free play; 
its ability to produce new forms in artistic practices; lastly and most 
importantly its conflict with reason carries out “unexpected cogni-
tive implications” (Makkreel 1990 51). We have focused on the relation 
between the imagination and reason in the sublime as the one with most 
serious consequence. In the sublime, the regressive performance of the 
imagination with respect to time raised the question of whether the 
progressive sequence of time is annihilated or not. In order to examine 
this point as well as recalling some sections from the first Critique we 
have appealed to a transcendental and a poststructuralist standpoint. 
9 Following Lyotard, Schlutz states that the performance and thus, the position of the 
imagination is “paradoxical and painfully conflicted” with respect to the Kantian 
transcendental philosophy. This is because: “at once the solution for the most vexing 
conceptual problems and a dreaded intrusion of lawless irrationality into the court of 
reason, the faculty opens up a conceptual abyss that the Kantian system, in spite of its 
rigorous unifying mechanisms, remains unable to close”. Hence, according to Schlutz, 
in its the non-synthetic functions the imagination is also “disruptive” and “dangerous” 
for the unity of the faculties (cf. 139).
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If handled in a transcendental manner, as Makkreel suggests, the 
regress of the imagination provides “the possibility of a transcendental 
philosophy” by revealing the supersensible side in us (cf. 1990 86-87). 
Nevertheless, if a poststructuralist view is taken, then the imagination 
both supports and disturbs the unity of the subject in the third Critique. 
Lyotard contends that the judgment of taste promises a subject whereas 
the sublime threatens it. In the judgment of the beautiful, through 
the harmony of the faculties, the subject is promised, whereas in the 
sublime, the very conflict of reason and the imagination threatens the 
unity of faculties. This is because the inability and thus, the agony of 
the imagination reveal a differend which addresses the distinctness and 
the incommensurability of the faculties.
I think both approaches have their advantages. The transcen-
dental approach has shown that the conflict caused by the regress of 
the imagination can be interpreted without falling into metaphysical 
speculation. Yet, the poststructuralist approach may prevent us from 
empowering the faculties of the mind for the sake of unity. The signifi-
cance of these two approaches for this particular study lies in the fact 
that taken together they emphasize that in aesthetic comprehension, 
the Kantian employment of the imagination supplies a rich hermeneu-
tical ground for evaluating the relation between the theoretical and 
aesthetic levels of experience. This leads us to the conclusion that if we 
are to investigate the theory of the imagination in Kant’s two Critiques 
or if we are to decide whether the alterations in the status and powers 
of the imagination are contradictory or developmental for the Kantian 
framework, we should be aware of the fact that whether it is a faculty 
or a mere function of the understanding, the imagination plays a cen-
tral role in both cognition and aesthetics. Therefore, considering the 
changes regarding to the role of the imagination it may be more fruit-
ful for Kantian philosophy to embrace different appearances of the 
imagination, since it seems that further research into the imagination 
can reveal undiscovered aesthetic or logical possibilities. Therefore, 
it is a prominent feature of Kant’s philosophy that should be taken as 
developmental rather than contradictory.
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